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IH THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD
OF TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS,
AND HELPERS OF AMERICA,
LOCALS No. 222 and 976, for and
on behalf of membership,

Petitioners and Appellants
vs.
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
OF THE STATE OF UTAH, ITS
BOARD OF REVIEW, APPEALS
REFEREE AND CLAIMS SUPERVISOR, INTERMOUNTAIN OPERATORS LEAGUE, ORANGE
TRANSPORTATION
COMPANY
and INLAND FREIGHT LINES,

Case No.
8428

Respondents and Appellees.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Petitioners and Appellants, Local Unions
No. 222 and 976, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs and Helpers of America, are here
representing their various members who have been
denied uNemployment compensation benefits under
1
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Section 35-4-5 (d), Utah Code Anrtotated, 1953.
The claimants claim benefits from the 19th day of
May, 1955 until the 11th day of June, 1955. During
that period a strike was in progress at Pacific Intermountain Express Company and Consolidated
Freightways, Inc., but the employees of those companies are not claimants herein. Strikes were in
progress from the 12th day of June until about the
19th day of June, 1955, against Orange Transportation Company, Inland Freight Lines and Milne
Freight Lines, during which time no benefits are
claimed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
At the hearing before the Appeals Examiner it
was stipulated that the Intermountain Operators
League was composed of trucking companies operating in Utah and Idaho, and that Arrowhead Freightlines, Interstate Motor Lines, Utah-Arizona Freight
Lines, Garrett Freight Lines, Inc., Gallagher Freight
Lines, Consolidated Freightways, Inc., Ringsby Truck
Lines, Co., Pacific Intermountain Express Co., Inland
Freight Lines and Orange Transportation Company
had in the past bargained through the Intermountain
Operators League. It was agreed that the Intermountain Operators League and four local unions in
Utah and Idaho have been parties to collective bargaining agreements covering operations in Utah and
Idaho, and that thf' 1952-10:3:3 Master Labor Agree-

2
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ment was completely terminated by both the Unions
and the League (R 50, 62). Following the termination of this contract there was no contractual obligation on the part of the union to have their members
report to work for any employer, and also no obligation on the part of the employer to provide work for
any employee.
The Intermountain Operators League is a voluntary association of Employers who have joined together for the purposes of bargaining within the
states of Utah and Idaho. (R 62) The Orange Transportation Company withdrew from the Intermountain Operators League by a letter addressed to the
Unions on February 24, 19S5, (Appellants Exhibit
No. 1), which reads:
"On behalf of Orange Transportation
Company, Inc. notice is hereby given that
they are no longer a part of the bargaining
unit which has heretofore entered into the
agreement between the Intermountain Operators League and yourself.
"Orange Transportation Company, Inc.
desires to bargain as an individual and will
meet at any time that is convenient to the
parties involved."
Following this letter, the Orange Transportation
Company, Inc. did not participate in the bargaining
sessions between the unions and the Intermountain
3
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Operators League (R 42, 65, 66). An officer of the
Company, however, did attend some of the meetings
strictly as an observer ·cR 43), but refused to acknowledge their presence at such meeting. The Intermountain Operators League was not authorized to nor
could it bind Orange Transportation Company, Inc.,
Inland Freight Lines or Milne Freight Lines to any
collective bargaining agreement, as they announced
that they would not sign the agreement reached on
the Coast, and a separate strike was called against
those companies CR 47). Individual bargaining was
carried on with Orange Transportation Company,
Inland Freight Lines and Milne Freight Lines until a
new contract was agreed to by the parties. (R 47).
The Unions and Employers held negotiation
meetings in Salt Lake City prior to May 1, 1955, seeking to agree upon a new contract. The Union demands were submitted to the Employers and the
counter proposals submitted through the League CR
24, 26). After the first week in May, 1955~ there
were no further meetings between the unions and
the Intermountain Operators League (R ++~ 64, 65).
Meetings were held in Los Angeles between Unions
and Employers of the eleven western states, and
P. I. E. and Consolidated Freightways operate in
most of the vVestern States. CR +4~ 6+, 65).
All ten of the Employers of the Intermountain
Operators League posted cargo embargos at Chicago
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and other Eastern points on the 27th and 28th of
April, 1955, and at West Coast points on the 28th of
April, 1955, advising their customers that they would
not accept any more business CR 45, 49, 68). These
same employers also on the Saturday prior to May
1st, 1955, posted notices advising their employees
that there would be no further work until they were
notified. CR 45) Mr. Callister stated that the reason
for these notices \Yas that the Employers did not know
whether they could operate after the first day of
May as their contract had been terminated CR 68).
The Unions had on many occasions promised and
guaranteed that the Employers would have sufficient
notice of any strike that they could plan their operations and would guarantee delivery of any freight
on their docks or in transit. ( R 48, 64, 68) .
The Employers submitted several proposals,
among which was a proposal to eleminate the procedure of changing division points (Employers Exhibit A, R 26). Such proposals were discussed at the
Salt Lake meetings, with Pacific Intermountain Express and Consolidated Freightways taking the lead
in such demands for change in terminal points ( R
44) . The meetings were then moved to Los Angeles
and P. I. E. and Consolidated made new demands
for terminal changes to be effective over their entire
operations in the 11 vVestern States. CR ~t5). The
demands and issue of the terminal change made by
P. I. E. and Consolidated at the Los Angeles MPetings
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was the sole issue that the strike was called against
them (R 44, 52). The other Employers of the
Intermountain Operators League did not take a firm
stand or position on the terminal change issue either
at Salt Lake or in the Los Angeles Meetings (R 52).
The terminal issue was the sole issue for the strike
against P. I. E. and Consolidated on the 19th of May,
1955. (R 44, 45 52).
The Intermountain Operators League first announced "a strike against one will be considered a
strike against all" on the night before the pickets were
established at P. I. E. and Consolidated, and after the
strike .had ben decided upon (R 46, 61). This was
the only announcement of such a policy to be taken
by the League and was made even though there had
been no meetings between the parties since the 1st
week of May, and the strike issues were determined
in Los Angeles and over· the 11 Western States (R
46) . The spokesman for the union informed the
League that all employees were ready, willing and
ready to work for all Employers except P. I. E. and
Consolidated (R 46). The League was also informed
that all other Companies could operate and the unions
would give them sufficient notice if they \Yere struck
so that all freight could be delivered (R 65).
The Employer members of the Intermountain
Operators League posted a second cargo boycott at
Eastern and Western customer ter~inal points as
6
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soon as they learned of the strike at P. I. E. and
Consolidated (R 48, 49). At the same time notices
were posted by the employers that their employees
were not to report for work until called, but all did
not completely close down their operations (R 48,
54). There was sufficient freight and business available for the employers to operate if they had accepted
it CR 49).
At no time did any employee fail to report for
work, but on the contrary were at all times, ready,
willing and presented themselves for work (R 48).
Some employees were retained by their employers
nearly all of the period from May 19th to June 12th
to move regular freight of the employer (R 48, 55).
There was never any strike, work stoppage, slow
down or refusal to work on the part of the employees
of any employer other than P. I. E. and Consolidated
during the time in question ( R 45) .
There is no past history of the Employers taking
the position that a strike against one is a strike
against all, as in the past when one employer was
shut down the remainder operated ( R 74) .
A memorandum agreement was reached in negotiations between Employers and the unions of the
11 Western states at Los Angeles, and several member
of the Intermountain Operators League declined to
accept the terms of this agreement. ( R 47, 65). The
7
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union was advised that the League did not represent
these employers and could not bargain for them
( R 65) . A picket line and strike was called against
Orange Transportation Company, Inc., Inland Freight
Lines and Milne Freight Lines on the 12th day of
June and lasted about a week (R 47). No new agreement has been signed between the parties but have
orally agreed to accept the memorandum agreement
terms as reached in Los Angeles (R 47).
STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON
POINT ONE
THE FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND DECISION OF
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ARE NOT SUPPORTED
BY EVIDENCE.

POINT TWO
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION FAILED TO MAKE
FINDINGS OF FACTS REQUIRED TO DISQUALIFY
CLAIMANTS FOR- BENEFITS UNDER AND BY VIRTUE
OF SECTION 35-4-5 (d) .

SUBPOINT A
WAS THE CLAIMANTS UNEMPLOYMENT DUE TO
A STOPPAGE OF WORK?

SUBPOINT B
WAS THERE A STOPPAGE OF \YORK EXISTING
BECAUSE OF A STRIKE INVOLVING THE GRADE, CLASS
OR GROUP OF WORKERS OF THE CLAIMANTS HEREIN?
8
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SUBPOINT C
THERE WAS NO STRIKE INVOLVING THE GRADE,
CLASS OR GROUP OF WORKERS AT THE FACTORY OR
ESTABLISHMENT WHERE CLAIMANTS ARE OR WERE
LAST EMPLOYED.

SUBPOINT D
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ERRED IN APPLYING THE LAW IN MAKING ITS CONCLUSION AND
DECISION.

ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
THE FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND DECISION OF
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ARE NOT SUPPORTED
BY EVIDENCE.

The Industrial Commission, Department of Employment Security, of the State of Utah, by a two to
one vote, adopted as its own, the findings of fact,
conclusions and decision of the Appeals Referee of
that department CR 96:98), and it is from these that
this Petition for Review is taken.
The finding in paragraph 3 of the Findings of
Fact CR 79) "that they desired certain changes in
any operating agreement to be effective after May
1~ 19-5-5" is unsupported by evidence.
The union
in its notice to the Employer Group CR 23) completely terminated the 19S2-1 9·3.') Master Labor
9
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Agreement. Thereafter both the Union and the Employers ·considered that the contract had been completely terminated and there was no agreement in
existance.
The finding in Paragraph 5 of the Findings of
Fact CR 79) "Orange Transportation Company * * *
subsequently carried on its bargaining with the
union in conjunction with the other operators" is unsupported by evidence. Orange Transportation Company by written letter (Appellants Exhibit No. 1)
withdrew from the bargaining unit and announced
that it vvould bargain on an individual basis. The
Orange Transportation Company representatives attended some of the meetings but only as an observer
and refused to sign the roll indicating participation.
No notice was ever given to the union that Orange
Transportation Company were participating with the
group. The Union and Orange Transportation Company Inland Freight Lines, and Milne Freight Lines
bargained individually to gain a new contract, after
a strike was called against these Employers when
they refused to be bound by any agreement accepted
by the others. The League was never authorized to
sign and bind Orange to any agreement and the only
agreement was signed by Orange itself.
The finding in paragraph 6 of the Findings of
Fact ( R 79), "but vvhen no agreernent had been
reached h~' May 1 S, 1955, thE' Union informed the
10
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League that they intended to call a strike against
Pacific Intermountain Express Company and the Consolidated Freightways Inc.", is contrary to the evidence. There were no meetings between the unions
and the Intermountain Operators League following
the first week in May, 1955. The negotiations were
then moved to Los Angeles, California, and the
unions and employers of the eleven Western states
participated. The evidence is that the only sole
reason for the strike against Pacific Intermountain
Express and Consolidated Freightways was those two
companies insistance on the terminal change. The
other companies of the Intermountain Operators
League had a bondoned this position, and the two
companies above caused the issue to be raised
throughout their operations in the eleven western
states, and the strike covered their operations
throughout those states. There is no evidence that
the strike against Pacific Intermountain Express and
Consolidated Freightways cover the eleven western
states was because of a failure to reach an agreement
covering Utah and Idaho.
The finding in Paragraph 8 of the Findings of
Fact ( R 79) "that due to inability to guarantee delivery because of the strike and the resulting substantial
decline in business and due to their announced
policy, * * *The claimants in this case are the employees of said employers who became unemployed
when operations were thus curtailed.", is unsupported
11
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by evidence. The Unions in the April meeting
promised and guaranteed the employers, and each
of them, that if a strike was called that all freight on
their docks or in transit could be delivered. The
Unions throughout continued to make such promise
to guarantee delivery of freight, and when the strike
)against P. I. E. and Consolidated was called such
promise was kept. The Employers on or about the
27th day of April, 1955, notified their customers in
the East and on the West Coast that they were declining to receive any freight and were suspending
operations. A second embargo on the receipt of
freight was issued about the 19th day of May, 1955,
and the lack of freight, if any, resulted therefrom.
The strike against P. I. E. and Consolidated, two of
the largest competitors, increased the business for
other employers, and there was sufficient freight
available had the employers chosen to accept it.
The announced policy in this finding apparently
refers to the statement of Mr. Callister made \Yhen he
informed, on the evening before the strike began,
that the strike had been called against P. I. E. and
Consolidated over the eleven vYestern states, a strike
against one vdll be considered a strike against all.
This was the first time that such a statement, or
policy had been made by the League. In past years
when one had been struck the others had operated.
The fact that the emplo:yers closed do\Yn their operations on the 1st day of lVIa}", \Yhen there \Yas no strike,
12
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disturbance or threat of strike, shows that the employers here locked out their employees and that the
strike was not the cause of it but only an excuse for
it. The unemployment of these claimants is because
of the acts of the employers in putting out a embargo
against business, and voluntarily closing down rather
than to the lack of business or the effect of the strike.
The findings in Paragraph 9, Findings of Fact,
CR 80) are a distortion of the facts and unsupported
by the evidence. The negotiations in Los Angeles,
California resulted in an understanding being reached
between the unions and employers in the eleven
western states. This memo of understanding was
accepted by many of the unions and employers, but
Inland Freight Lines, Orange Transportation Company, l\!Iilne Freight Lines all refused to accept this
agreement. The strike against Pacific Intermountain
Express and Consolidated Freight Lines was settled
on the 11th of June, by these companies accepting the
new agreement. A strike was commenced against
Inland Freight Lines, Orange Transportation Company and Milne Freight Lines on this on June 12 and
lasted until about June 19, 195-5, when these employers agreed to accept this nevv agreement.
POINT TWO
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION FAILED TO MAKE
FINDINGS OF FACTS REQUIRED TO DISQUALIFY
CLAIMANTS FOR BENEFITS UNDER AND BY VIRTUE
OF SECTION 35-4-5 (d) ..

13
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The group of claimants were denied unemployment compensation due to their being unemployed
from the 19th day of May, 1953, through the 12th
day of June, 1955, by virtue of the provisions of Section 35-4-5 (d), Utah Code Annotated, 1953.
The original Employment Security Act of the
State of Utah was passed in 1935, and the disqualification provision then read:
"An employee shall not be entitled to
benefits:
" ( 3) If he has left or lost his employment due to a trade dispute involving the employer by whom- he was employed, so long
as such trade dispute continues ... "
This statute was patterened after an act suggested and proposed by the Federal Security Board
and by them adopted from the British National Insurance Act. Under the British Act, and adopted in
most of the states, the disqualification is based upon
his leaving due to a "trade" or "labor dispute"
at the factory, establishment or other premises.- The
Utah Act of 1935 used the term '"trade dispute"
taken directly from the British Act. In England the
word "labor" carries a political implication \Yhich is
associated with the Labor Party and thus under the
terminology of the English trade dispute and labor
dispute were synonymous. In 1936 the Utah Legislatun' revvrote the section entirely removed the refer-

1+
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ance to "trade dispute" and now require that a
"strike" be present, and did not change to a labor
dispute definition such as passed in 1933 and is now
34-1-34, U.C.A., 1953.
The Amended Act, Section 35-+-S, U.C.A., 1953,
provides in part:

"':5. An individual shall be ineligible for
benefits for purposes of establishing a waiting period:
"(d) For any week in which it is found
by the Commission that his unemployment
is due to a stoppage of work which exists because of a strike involving his grade, class, or
group of workers at the factory or establishment at which he is or was last employed."
In general the various states have adopted two
general distinct types of disqualification statutes involving labor difficulties. A majority of the states
adopted the type which Utah passed in 1935, which
makes the disqualification where the claimant has
left or lost his employment because of or due to a
trade or labor dispute involving his employer. The
second type, which has been adopted in many Western States, disqualified the claimant only where there
is a finding that the unemployment is due to a stoppage of work which exists because of a labor dispute,
strike or lockout at the factory or establishment where
he is or vvas employed.

15
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Of the second type of statute, Arizona demands
a finding of a "labor dispute" or "lock out," Colorado
a finding of a "strike," Oklahoma a finding of a
"Labor Dispute," and Utah of course a finding of a
"strike."
The distinction and difference in the requirements to be found in these types of statues as well as
the vast distinction between a "labor dispute" or
"trade dispute" and "strike" are of the utmost importance in the decision in this matter.
A study of the language of the provisions of Section 35-4-5 (d) and it becomes apparent that the
Commission must find several facts before the claimant is disqualified, namely, ( 1) that his unemployment is due to a stoppage of work, (2) that the stoppage of work must exist because of a strike involving
his grade, class or group of workers, and ( 3) that
the strike must involve his grade, class, or group of
workers at the factory or establishment which he is
or was last employed. The Industrial Commission
has failed to make findings of fact as required by the
a hove section, and the matters \Yill be taken up for
discussion in the a hove order.

SUBPOINT A.
WAS THE CLAIMANTS UNE:\IPLOYMENT DUE TO
A STOPPAGE OF WORK?

16
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There is a split of authorities in the courts of the
United States as to whether the "stoppage of work"
referred to means a stoppage by the individual employee, or to a stoppage of the operation of the business of the employer.
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma In MidContintent Petroleum Corp. v. Board of Review, 141
Pac. 2d 69, with a disqualification provision like that
of Utah, said:
"The reasoning of the foregoing officers
and writers is not very impressive when applied to our Act of 1936. Had the legislature
intended to refer to a shutdown of the plant
and not to the cessation of vvork by the employees, the term 'stoppage of operations'
would have been far more appropriate. It
seems to us that the word 'work' ordinarily
refers to or comprehends the activities of the
workman, not the operation of the factory.
That portion of the act, supra, which disqualified a workman for benefits 'for any week
* * * in which his total or partial unemployment is due to a stoppage of work which exists
because of a labor dispute at the factory' refers,
with respect to the workman, to his unemployment and to his stoppage of work. A
strike in a labor sense is generally defined as
a stoppage of work by common agreement of
\Yorkingmen. 15 C. J. S. 1008, Par. 11. That
was the definition evidently in mind of the
Legislature; the term 'stoppage of work' was
considered synonymous with 'strike.' "

17
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However, the Supreme Court of Arizona in Sakrison v. Pierce 66 Ariz. 162, 185 P2d 528, 173 ALR 480,
in applying the Arizona disqualification statute which
is identical to Section 35-4-5 (d) of Utah, except that
it reads "which exists because of a labor dispute, strike
or lock-out at the factory," and after quoting the disqualification provisions of Alabama, California and
Ohio, said:
"In each of these, the disqualification is
made to depend not upon the cessation of operations at the employers establishment as is
true in Arizona, but instead upon 'labor dispute ... in active progress'; 'trade dispute ...
in active progress'; 'labor dispute continues.'
There is no added requirement, such as in our
statute, to the effect that the dispute must be
of such an intense nature that it results in
the virtual closing down of the place of business before compensation is denied to those unemployed as a result thereof .
. "For all the reasons outlined, then the
appellees in the case at bar are not disqualified
from receiving benefits under Sec. 56-1005 (d)
of the Arizona Act. By any reasonable interpretation of this section, and consonant with
the weight of authority, the fact that they confine their claims to a period after the hotel had
resumed normal operations saves them from
the effects of our disqualification clause.
Should a different policy be desired, the relief lies with the legislature, and not \Yith this
court."
·
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The fact that a claimant may be unemployed because of a stoppage of work does not disqualify that
claimant for benefits under Section 35-4-5 (d). There
must be present the additional fact that the unemployment be due to a stoppage of work which exists
because of a strike. This principle was applied by
this court in Employees of Lion Coal Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 100 U 207, 111 P 2d 797, where the
Employer posted a notice on the 18th day of April that
the mine would be closed for 30 days. The union
notified the Employer that the interium agreement
which they had been operating under would be
terminated on midnight on the 4th of May, and there
would be a strike. The mine closed down on the
date notified, but posted the usual work sign on the
7th, 8th, 9th and 10th of May, and on the 11th the
union notified the Company that they could operate,
and the Company removed the work sign.
On page 798 of Pac. 2d the Court said:

"* * * In the Utah Fuel case there was a
definite relationship between the prior stoppage of work and the strike. However, in the
instant case, it could not be found that the
stoppage of work in April existed because of
the strike weeks after the mine had been
closed.
"The Company makes no claim that it
was able and ready to provide employment for
the petitioners on any days other than May
8th, 9th, 10th and 11th, 1939. The petitioners
19
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were given their respective lay off slips on the
20th of April because the company did not
have sufficient orders to warrant continued
operations. When circumstances changed in
May, the company had sufficient business to
warrant operations and manifested an intention to operate and offered employment by
posting the 'work sign.' Then the stoppage of
work was no longer due to acts of the company
but was due to the strike of the petitioners."
In Gulf Atlantic Warehouse Co. v. Bennett, ....
............ Ala ................ , 51 So 2d 544, it was held that
the unemployment was due to the company's apprehension of a strike and its notification of its customers
that there might be a strike at the expiration of the
present contract, and as a result thereof the customers
ceased doing business with the employer, that the unemployment was not due to a labor dispute but due
to the notice.
See also Barrett v. Wasson Coal Co., +04 Ill. 11,
87 NE 2d 769.
All of the employer members of the Intermountain Operators League sent out notices to their
customers at Chicago, the mid-\Yest and on the
West Coast, advising that they would not accept any
freight following the 1st day of May. This freight
embargo was posted by the Employers on or about
the 27th or 2gth of April and not removed until
after May 1st, 1955. These Employers also posted
notices at their places of business that they \Yere clos20
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ing down and their employees would be notified
when to report for work. Again, on or about the
19th day of May, 1955, all of the Employers posted a
second embargo on the receipt of freight at the
Eastern and Western customer points. The employers again notified their employees not to report
to work as no work was available until they were
called. These embargos were effective is shown by
the testimony of Mr. Dippo, Vice President of Inland
Freight Lines, who testified that prior to the 19th
day of May they were running about 100% empty
and so they just closed down. On the other hand
there is testimony that there was sufficient freight for
the employers to continue operations during the
period involved.
The only finding by the Commission as to a
work stoppage is in Paragraph 7, Findings of Fact,
CR 79) in connection with incomplete but substantial
vvork stoppage incurred at Pacific Intermountain
Express and Consolidated Freightways. The finding
in Paragraph 8, Findings of Fact, CR 79) is that the
claimants became unemployed when the operations
of their employers were curtailed because of declining business and announced policy, and not because
of a work stoppage effecting these claimants. Hence~
the unemployment vvhich existed from the 19th of
May to the 12th of June, 1955, was due to the lack
of business and voluntary suspension of operations or
the part of the employers.
21
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SUBPOINT B
WAS THERE A STOPPAGE OF WORK EXISTING
BECAUSE OF A STRIKE INVOLVING THE GRADE, CLASS
OR GROUP OF WORKERS OF THE CLAIMANTS HEREIN?

The Re-Statement of Torts, Section 797, Comment a., defines a strike thusly:
"A strike is a concerted refusal by employees to do any work for their employer or
to work at a customary rate of speed until the
object of the strike is attained, that is until the
employer grants the concession demanded."
The Supreme Court of Colorado in Sandoval v.
Industrial Commission, 110 Colo. 108, 130 Pac. 2d
930, wherein the question of whether or not a strike
was involved, and the statute in Colorado is identical
to Section 35-4-5- (d), the Court defined a strike as:
"A strike possesses at least four ingredients
other than the suspended employer-employee
relationship which has been mentioned, namely; ( 1) a demand for some concession, generally for a modification of conditions of labor or
rates of pay; (2) a refusal to work, with intent
to bring about compliance with the demand;
( 3) an intention to return to work ·when compliance is accomplished; and ( 4) an intention
on the part of the operator to re-employ the
same men or Inen of similar class \Yhen the
demands are acceded to or \Yithdrawn, or
otherwise adjusted."
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The Colorado Court then stated that the term
labor dispute is much broader than is the term strike,
and that there could be a labor dispute without a
strike but not vise-versa.
In Baker v. Powhatan Mining Company, 146
Ohio State 600, 6 7 NE 2d 714, held that collective
and concerted discontinuance of work by employees
for the purpose of obtaining better terms and improving conditions constitute a strike. In Bankston Creek
Coaleries v. Gordon, 399 Ill. 291, 71 NE 2d 670 held
that a strike involves a labor dispute but a labor dispute can exist without a strike.
In Iron Molders' Union No. 125 v. Allis-Chalmers Co., ( CCA 7), 166 Fed 45, the Circuit Court
defined a strike and lockout as:
"A strike is a cessation of work by employees in effort to get for the employees more
desirable terms. A lockout is a cessation of
the furnishing of work to employees in an
effort to get for the employer more desirable
terms."
Bouvier's Law Dictionary, Baldwin's Century
Edition, page 1140, defines a strike as:
"A combined effort by workmen to obtain
higher wages or other concessions for their
employer by stopping work at a preconcerted
time."
23
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The term "lockout' is defined in Restatement
of Torts Section 787, comment a, as follows:
"A. A lockout is an employer's withholding of work from his employees in order
to gain a concession from them. It is the
employer's counterpart of a strike."
W ebsters New International Dictionary, Second
Edition, defines lockout:
"Lockout: To \Vithold employment from
(a body of employees) as means of bringing
them to accept the employers terms."
In Atchinson T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Gee, 140 Fed.
+5, 53, as:
"An employer's discharge of employees
about to enter upon a strike, done before they
can strike, is commonly called a 'lockout.' "
The Supreme Court of Minnesota in Bucko v.
J. F. Quest Foundry, 229 Minn. 131, said concerning
"strike" and "lockout," in a case where a strike "'as
called against three of a group of employers \Yho had
bargained together:
"It can hardly be said that respondent aiH 1
the others similarly situated \YC'n-. out of \Ye:·k
, due to a strike aga{nst the three establishments
in which they \YC'n" not employed. The terrn
'strike' cannot be extended to encompass those
nine employers \vhose employees \Yere \villing
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to continue working under the terms of the
former contract."
And later said:

" * * * The fact that a strike was called
against three did not compel the other nine to
close their shops. They did so in order to make
use of an economic weapon which they held
in their hands and for the sole purpose of
forcing the union to accept terms less favorable
than those which the union demanded. The
evidence is conclusive that at the time the nine
establishments closed their doors, the employers of those nine were willing to continue
to work at the existing rates of pay and according to the terms of the pre-existing contract.
As such it cannot be said that the unemployment was due to a strike." (Emphasis added)
There was a strike, under the definitions above,
against Pacific Intermountain Express and Consolidated Freightways from the 19th day of May until
the 12th day of June, 1955. Also there was a strike
against Orange Transportation Company, Inland
Freight Lines and Milne Freight Lines, from the 12th
day of June until about the 19th day of June, 1955.
The strike against Pacific Intermountain Express and
Consolidated Freightways covered their entire operations in most of the eleven Western States. The
evidence is conclusive that all of the claimants herein were ready willing and able and presented themselves to work for their employers at all of the times
herein involved, and that there was no refusal, or
25
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

voluntary unemployment on the part of these employees.
There is no dispute that the Employers posted
notices, one prior to the 1st of May, and one on or
about the 19th of May, advising their employees
that they would not work until notified. Also there
is no dispute that the closing down of the Employers
herein was a lockout of the claimants, for Mr.
Callister, testified CR 64):
"A. Yes-to hit one just the same as they
hit anyone but under the lavv they are not required to, of course strike everbody at the same
time and the only defense we have, of course,
if that they hit one they hit us all. In other
words, a strike against P. I. E. was a strike
against us for the reason that assuming that
we continued to operate and if P.I.E. made a
settlement, that settlement would be what ,,~e
would take." (emphasis added)
The stoppage of \-Vork which cause the unemployment of the claimants herein was not due to a
strike, but to the planned, arbitrary, unilateral plan
of the Employers to lockout their employers. The
obvious evidence of such pre-conceived plan vvas the
lockout of their employees on the Saturday prior to
May 1st, 195·3. The strike against P.I.F. and Consolidated did not force the other Employers to cease
operation, for the evidence is that there \vas ample
freight for then1 to operate, and some Trucking Com-
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panies did operate during the time. In other words,
the Employers were in direct competition with the
struck companies for freight and the strike against
P.I.E. and Consolidated would have greatly increased
the amount of business for the remaining carriers,
and enhanced their operations.
The Commission did not find that there was a
strike which caused a work stoppage which caused
the unemployment of these claimants. Nor did the
Commission find that there was a strike involving
workers of the grade, class or group of the claimant.
We submit that under the definitions of "strike"
herein that the only strike was against Pacific Intermountain Express and Consolidated Freightways, and
that the action of the other Employers here was a
'·lockout" plain and simple, for which the Legislature
of the State of Utah did not disqualify claimants regardless of the cause of the "lockout."
SUBPOINT C
THERE WAS NO STRIKE INVOLVING THE GRADE,
CLASS OR GROUP OF WORKERS AT THE FACTORY OR
ESTABLISHMENT WHERE CLAIMANTS ARE OR WERE
LAST EMPLOYED.

We submit that the only strike during the time
herein involved was against Pacific Intermountain
Express and Consolidated Freightways. There was
no strike by or envolving any grade, class or group of
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workers of the eight other trucking companies, and
these claimants were not employed, hired, paid,
supervised, carried on the payroll, or had any relationship whatever with the two struck companies.
The employers of these claimants closed down their
operations about the 19th day of May, and these
workers had been and were hired, employed, paid,
supervised, carried on the payroll and they performed
services only for their individual employer and no
others.
Generally the various states in their employment
security statutes requires that the strike, labor dispute, trade dispute, or lockout be in progress at the
establishment, factory or other premises ,,·here the
claimant is or was last employed. The interpretation of these terms have come before the courts several
times, but not with complete uniformity. However,
once again; the statutes upon which these decisions
are based must be scrutini?:ed to determine if they
require a strike at the factory or establishment where
claimant is or was last employed, and not the general
terms of a trade or labor dispute at the factory,
f'"tablishment or other premises where last employed.
The Supreme Court of Minnesota in Nordling
v. Ford Motor Co., +2 N,Y. 2.d 5 76, said:
"It is true that our act contemplates
compensation for those "·ho are unemployed
because of no fault of their O\Yn. flo\Yever~
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where there is an express proVIsion for disqualification, the facts must come within the
meaning of the words used by the majority if
the disqualification is to be effective. The
disqualification which we have under consideration related to unemployment due to a labor
dispute, and it is clear that before such labor
dispute can effectively disqualify it must be in
progress at the establishment at which the
claimant is or was employed. The mere fact
that the employees are represented by the same
agent will not suffice to disqualify if the strike
or labor dispute causing the unemployment is
not in progress at the establishment at which
the claimant was, or is, employed." (emphasis
added).
And later said:
"We believe that the solution of the problem lies in determining from all the facts
available whether the unit under consideration
is a separate establishment from the standpoint of employment, and not whether it is
a single enterprise from the standpoint of management or for the more effecient production
of goods."
In most of the cases decided upon the specific
point the employer has been one which has had
several plants in operation in the production of an
integrated product. As in the above case, the Ford
Motor Company, and in General Motors v. Mulquinn,
134 Conn. 118, 55 A 2d 732, two plants in the production of a single product, and the closing of one be-
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cause of a labor dis.pute forces the other to close because of lack of materials. The Supreme Court of
Conn., said:

"* * * Geographical separation is important but is by no means controlling. Where,
as here, a manufacturing corporation carries
on its business in buildings at different localities, the test is whether they are so operated as
to constitute a single unit; if so, they amount
to a single factory. The application of this test
requires a consideration of many factors, such
as the scheme of management, supervision,
and the production of each plant; that is,
whether or not those locally in immediate
charge, let us say, of the one plant, are subject to the authority of those operating the
other, as distinguished from their being under
the control of policy-framing officials ranking
higher in the pyramid of the corporate structure."
The Supreme Court of Arizona, held in Mountain
.States Tele. and Tele. v. Sakrison, 71 Ariz. 219 225
Pac. 2d 707, that 39 · exchanges of the telephone
company in Arizona were one single establishment~
on the bases of interdependency and operational control.
See also: Neidliner v. Unemployment Comp. B
of R., 710 Pa. Super. 166, 84 A 2d 363; Spielmann v.
Ind. Comm., 236 \V"isc. 2+0, 295 NW1; Ford Motor
Co. v. Unemployment Co1npensation Com. 191 Ya.
812, 63 SE 2d 28; and Matson Terminals v. Calif.
Emp. Comm. 24 Cal. 2d 695, 151 P. 2d 202.
30
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

\Ve believe the Supre1ne Court of Minnesota, in
Nordling v. Ford Motor Co., supra, expressed the
intention of the Utah legislature when it said:
"The only substantial change in the
language of our original act from the British
act was that the word 'establishment' was substituted for 'workshop.' It is difficult to believe that this change was intended to broaden
the scope of the employment area so as to encompass a whole industry rather than a single
unit of employment."
We have been unable to find a single case where
the precise question is, do ten distinct, competing,
independently owned and operated employers in the
same industry who bargain jointly constitute a
"factory" or "establishment" within the meaning of
the Employment Security Acts. We do not believe
that such a case will be found, and certainly such
was not the intention of the legislature of Utah when
such act was passed.
If claimant A is hired by, works for, is paid by,
carried on the payroll, supervised by and has all of
his job dealings with Garrett Freight Lines, certainly
all would agree that he is employed by or was last
employed by Garrett Freight Lines within the meaning of Section 35-4-5 (d) supra. A strike at Pacific
Intermountain Express and Consolidated Freightways would involve the employees of those companies
as they are or were last employed by o11e of these
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companies. There is no evidence that the Intermountain Operators League is an employer, or that it
bore any relationship of employee and employer to
any of these claimants, and certainly Pacific Intermountain Express does not and did not bear any relationship of employer-employee to claimant A who
worked for Garrett Freight Lines. VVe submit that
there is no evidence upon which to base a finding
that the strike involved claimants grade, class or
group of workers at the factory or establishment at
which he is or was last employed. In addition the
only evidence as to the reason for the strike called
against Pacific Intermountain Express and Consolidated Freightways was over the sole issue of the
change of terminals they insisted on over eleven
Western States. The change of terminal issue did
not affect the eight other employers as they \vere
not now seeking such change. Thus, the strike was
against two employers over an item \vhich did not
affect the employers of the claimants herein.
SUBPOINT D
THE INDUSTRIAL COl\1MISSION ERRED IN APPLYING THE LAW IN MAKING ITS CONCLUSION AND
DECISION.

The Appeals Referee in' his Con1n1ent~ CR 80,
81), which vvas adopted by the Industrial Comnlission, statf's that under the mandate of the decision of
this Court in Olof Nelson Construction Co. v. Industri-
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al Commission (. ___________ Utah ____________ , 243 Pac. 2d

951)'

"* * * it rnust be considered that the action
taken by the union against two of the employer
group was actually an action against the entire
group. Therefore, the entire membership of
the union group was involved in strike action
against the entire membership of the employer
group and the unemployment of the claimants
came about as a result of a stoppage of work
due to strike pressure brought to bear by the
Union."
This Court in the a hove case did not lay down
a mandate that action taken against two of the group
must be deemed to be action against the whole group,
and the claimants here be denied benefits.
In the Olof Nelson case, supra, the Associated
General Contractors and the unions had bargained as
a group for years and were then bound by a collective
bargaining agreement, which was open for the discussion of wages only; the sole and only dispute between the unions and the AGG was over the wage
increase; that the AGG gave a written notice to the
Union that a strike against one would be considered
a strike against all, and later made this policy known
to the union several times; that a strike vote was
taken and a strike called at the Barker and Paul jobs
only, and no picket or strike was established any
other job of these two employers; that the picketing
commenced on the 2nd day of June and by the 5th
33
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the Employers had all closed down their operations;
there was no doubt that the objective of the union in
striking the Paul and Baker jobs was to obtain wage
increases for everyone covered by the contract in effect and that this was the sole and only issue involved;
and that the union was successful in gaining a new
wage scale under the contract. Mr. Chief Justice
Wolfe wrote the majority decision, and stated that
the issue was:

" * * * This requires a determination of
the fundamental issue in this case -- what
caused the work stoppage and resulting unemployment?"
He quoted the disqualification provisions of Section 35-4-5 (a) (b) (c) and (d), and then said:
"Our conclusion is that the various disqualification provisions of our Employment
Security Act reveal that the underlying legislative intent is for the commission to determine
the claimant's elgibility by adhering to the
volitional test as announced in the Bodinson,
Bunny's Waffle Shop and McKinley Cases in
California."
In Conclusion said:
"Our cone lusion in this case is that the
sounder view is to recognizf' these large scale
bargaining units as the groups involved \Yithin
the meaning of the Employment Security Act.
Their nun1ber and scope are increasing. Both
34
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labor and management have seen fit to resort
to such a device for a uniform, expedient means
of negotiating their agreements. There is no
dispute that the economic sanction of the A.F.
of L. in this case was directed against the entire
employer association. The strike was called
for and on behalf of every employee covered
by the agreement. It therefore directly involved all these claimants, at each particular
place of employment at which they were last
employed. The strike was fomented by claimants through their duly authorized union representatives. They are members of the group
which gained a raise in wages because of the
strike and are parties to the scheme or plan to
foment it. Therefore they are not entitled to
unemployment benefits. The order of the
Industrial Commission is reversed. Costs are
awarded to the plaintiff."
This decision requiring the application of the
volitional tests of the Bodinson, Bunny's Waffle Shop
and McKinley cases in California to cases coming
under the Utah Employment Security Act, requires
and compels the Industrial Commission to make its
determination of disqualifications upon the merits
of the labor problem rather than on statutory provisions. Thus, the Industrial Commission finding
must be who is the party guilty of causing the work
stoppage which caused the unemployment, the
guilty party caused the action and this volition allows
or disallows the granting of benefits. This court
applied the volitional test to the facts of that case,
where the union and the AGG had a contract in
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force, the union applied economic action in the form
of a strike against all of the employers to obtain an
increase in wages for all of the employees covered
by the contract, the AGG having announced that
unemployment would result if this happened, the
claimant then, by the action of its union in striking
for the benefit of the claimant, because unemployed
of his own volition and was held ineligible for benefits.
The Appeals Referee and the Industrial Commission say that the Olof Nelson Construction case,
supra, requires the determination that the action of
the union in striking the two employers must be
considered as against the whole group, thus all of
the employees are involved and ineligible. Such
a position is a failure to apply the Olof Nelson Construction division, supra, to the facts before this court.
In the case at bar there was no contract between the union and the Intermountain Operators
League; the sole reason for the strike against P .I.E.
and Consolidated Freightways over their eleven state
operation was because they insisted and demanded
on the change in terminals in their eleven \Yestern
State operation~ the strike was called for the benefit
of the employees of P.I.E. and Consolidated Freightways only as the other employers had abandoned
the demand for tt:'nninal change; the employers
locked out their ernployt:'es and put up a cargo em-
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bargo at the expiration of the contract; no negotiations between the League and the union after the
first week in May; individual bargaining and acceptance of the memorandum agreement reached
in Los Angeles; strike against three employers after
others settled; no announcement by the League that
strike would cause unemployment, only made such
statement when learned the strike had been called;
the partial shut down of the employers after the
strike against P.I.E. and Consolidated; pickets were
established and the strike was against P .I.E. and
Consolidated Freightways at all of their points of
operations in the eleven Western States and not just
in Utah and Idaho; the ceasing of operation by the
employers was not due to the strike; and there was
no bargaining between the unions and the Intermountain Operators League after the 1st week in
May, the bargaining and the settlement of the new
contract was on an individual basis and only after
strikes against three additional employers.
Under the volitional tests established by the Olof
Nelson Construction Co., case, supra, the claimants
here are not unemployed by their own violation
and disqualified for benefits. The Intermountain
Operators League and the Union had no meetings
from the 1st week in May until the date of the
strike on the 19th of May. The issue over which the
strike was called was peculiar to P.I.E. and Consolidated only and the other employers did not make
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such demands in Los Angeles. The Employers
locked out their employees when the contract was
terminated, and again on or about the 19th of May,
1955, which lockout was not caused by or had anything to do with the strike against P .I.E. and Consolidated Freightways. We submit that the claimants herein were not unemployed by their own volition under the decision of the Olof Nelson Construction Co., case, supra, and are entitled to benefits
for the time they were unemployed because of the
employer lockout of these claimants.
The volitional tests of Bodinson Mfg. Co. v. California Employment Commission, 17 Cal. 2d 321, 109
P. 2d 935; Bunny's "\Vaffle Shop v. California Employment Comm., 24 Cal. 2d 735, 151 Pac. 2d 22~;
and McKinley v. California Employment S. Corn.,
34 Cal. 2d 238, Pac. 2d 602, which Chief Justice 'Yolfe
announced in the Olof Nelson Construction decision,
supra, depend on the California disqualification
statute, "An indivdual is not eligible for benefits ...
(a) if he left his work because of a trade dispute
and for the period during which he continues out of
work by reason of the fact that the trade dispute is
still in active progress in the establishment in which
he was employed." This California statute is substantially the same as the Utah disqualification
statute in 1935, which was repudiated by the Legislature in 1936. Obviously the Legislature felt that
the volitional test which required the Industrial Com38
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mission tD inquire into the merits of a labor question
was not suited to Utah, and changed to present disqualification provision.
In the Bodinson Case, supra, the California Court
determined that an employee who refused to cross
a picket line established by another union at his
place of employment voluntarily left his employment
due to a trade dispute, and was disqualified for benefits. In the Bunny's Waffle Case, supra, the California Court, where the employers were seeking group
bargaining but the Union resisted, and one restaurant
reduced it wages 25 cents per hour and instigated a 6
day week with split shifts, the employees left their
jobs, the other restaurants closed down, held that the
claimants left their work because of the action of the
employer in reducing wages and conditions and not
because of the trade dispute in existance with their
employer. The Court determined that though the
employees left their work of their own choice, that
choice was not freely made but was dictated by the
employers use of economic weapon of reduced wages
and conditions. In the McKinley case, supra, where
the union and employer had bargained for several
years, the group announced a policy of strike against
one as against all, in the past when one was struck
they all closed, when the picket was established the
union agent was informed that they all would close
and he replied that he expected as much, the entire
action was seeking a new uniform contract from
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the group covering wages, and at no time was there
any individual demand upon employers, the California Court held that the lockout was caused by
the strike and the employees, when they knew that
the strike would cause their unemployment, voluntarily left their employment under the disqualification provisions of the California statute.
We submit that the tests of these California
cases are not applicable herein, that the claimants
here were not unemployed because of their volitional
action in leaving their employment, and these claimants are entitled to receive compensation.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion we wish to again point out that
Section 35-4-5 (d) requires the Industrial Commission to find that the unemployment is due to a stoppage of work exisiting because of a strike involving
workers at the factory or establishment where claimant is or was last employed, and not upon a finding of
the merits of the labor trouble or that the claimant
left his employment because of a trade dispute.
The Intermountain Operators League locked out
their employees at the expiration date of the contract, had no further negotiations vvith the unions,
and when notified of a strike against P. I. E. and Consolidated Freight\Yo}rs locked out their employees
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again. There was no contract between the Unions
and the League, the issue that caused the strike was
limited solely to P. I. E. and Consolidated, the strike
was against these two Companies in all of the eleven
Western States, the employers locked out their employees and put out notices ceasing. business before
May 1st and again about May 20th, there was no
negotiations or dealings between the League and
the unions between those dates, there was no announced policy that a strike would cause a shutdown
prior to the strike, independent bargaining between
the unions and employers, and strikes called against
individual employers. Under these and other facts
the disqualification for benefits of Section 35-4-5 do
not apply, these claimants are entitled to compensation for time unemployed because of the lockout by
their employers, and the decision of the Industrial
Commission is in error and should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
CLARENCE M. BECK
REID W. NIELSON

Attorneys for Petitioners and
Appellants
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